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The Free Will-Determinism 
Debate and Social Work 
Frederic G. Reamer 
Rhode Island College 
Social workers'judgments about the determinants of clients' problems have a substantial 
effect on practitioners' willingness to provide assistance. There is considerable variation 
in professionals' beliefs about the extent to which clients are themselves responsible 
for their difficulties, as opposed to factors that are beyond their control. This article 
examines the philosophical controversy known as the free will-determinism debate, 
and assesses its implications for the profession of social work. 
In the fall of 1982, Time magazine featured a cover story on the dismal 
status of the U.S. prison system. During the week following its ap- 
pearance, two letters to the editor were published in response to the 
article's commentary on our nation's correctional institutions and their 
inmates: 
To the Editors: 
When considering prisons, it should be kept in mind that every inmate is 
there by choice. He made the decision to do time the moment he committed 
the crime. 
To the Editors: 
Our genes and our environment control our destinies. The idea of conscious 
choice is ridiculous. Yes, prisons should be designed to protect society, but 
they should not punish the poor slobs who were headed for jail from birth.' 
The juxtaposition of these letters is, of course, striking. Their authors 
clearly view the world through radically different lenses. The first is 
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committed to the view that individuals who violate our laws and statutes 
do so deliberately, willingly, and rationally. In short, criminals know 
what they are doing, and simply take calculated risks to which are 
attached, at least in principle, well publicized penalties. From the point 
of view of the second author, those convicted of breaking the law are 
essentially victims of misshapen genes or toxic environmental circum- 
stances that have led them forcibly down one of life's wayward paths. 
These contrasting views concerning the determinants of human 
misbehavior represent one of the most enduring controversies in re- 
corded history, commonly known as the free will-determinism debate. 
Put briefly, on one side are those who argue that human beings are 
willful actors who actively shape their own destinies and who inde- 
pendently make rational choices based on personal preferences and 
wishes. On the other side are those who claim that human behavior 
is largely or entirely determined by a series of antecedent events and 
factors, such that any given "choice" or behavior is a mere product of 
prior causes, be they psychological, environmental, mechanical, or 
physical. 
Implications for Social Work 
The free will-determinism debate is remarkably relevant to the practice 
of social work in at least two general ways. First, social workers repeatedly 
make assumptions about the determinants and malleability of clients' 
problems and shape interventions or treatment plans accordingly. Mental 
retardation, we may conclude, is a function of certain chromosomal 
abnormalities and is thus amenable to only a limited range of treatment 
approaches. Family discord, on the other hand, may emerge as a result, 
for example, of personality quirks of family members, the strain of a 
sudden illness, financial catastrophe, or certain learning disabilities. 
Poverty, we might argue, stems from individual lethargy, structural 
problems in our economy that lead to high rates of unemployment, 
or physical disabilities. How we respond to these problems-whether 
we focus our attention on environmental determinants, health problems, 
or individual character-frequently depends on assumptions that we 
make about the extent to which people's problems are the result of 
factors over which they have control. 
Second, the conclusions that social workers reach about the causal 
determinants of clients' difficulties frequently lead to assumptions about 
the extent to which they deserve assistance and whatever benefits or 
services there are to offer. If we conclude that a client is chronically 
depressed because of a series of unforeseen, tragic events in her life, 
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we may be more inclined to offer solace and support than we would 
be if we decide that her depression is a calculated, willful, protracted, 
and self-serving attempt to gain sympathy and attention. If we conclude 
that a client has difficulty retaining jobs because of a congenital disability 
that he has tried persistently to overcome, we may be more willing to 
invest our professional time and energy than we would with a client 
who is fired from jobs repeatedly because he resents having to show 
up for work at 8:30 A.M. each day. Thus, our willingness to attribute 
responsibility for clients' problems to factors that are to some extent 
beyond their control can affect our willingness to assist them. The 
free will-determinism debate therefore has bearing not only on social 
workers' beliefs about the causes of clients' difficulties and their capacity 
to change but, as well, on their willingness to help them change. 
One of the central pillars in the foundation of contemporary social 
work is the value of self-determination, a concept that is closely tied 
to assumptions about free will. Since the early 1900s, professional 
social workers have been guided by the assumption that a key mission 
of the profession is to help clients achieve what they want to achieve 
and to assist them in the formation and pursuit of meaningful goals. 
Underlying this principle, however, is a tacit assumption that clients 
have the capacity to chart and shape their lives-that they are not like 
billiard balls whose paths are fully determined by antecedent events - 
and, further, that they deserve social workers' assistance. It is thus 
clear that whatever position we take in the free will-determinism con- 
troversy, it stands to have a substantial effect on our inclination to 
uphold the longstanding principle of self-determination. Florence Hollis 
acknowledged this dilemma years ago in an address delivered at a 
United Nations seminar concerning the advanced study of social work: 
"The first question to be raised about these scientific principles is often 
the philosophical one of whether the assumption of lawfulness in 
behaviour and of cause and effect relationships in behaviour does not 
mean that casework has become completely deterministic. How can 
this be reconciled with the principle of self-determination?"''2 
The Nature of the Debate 
The free will-determinism debate actually has ancient philosophical 
roots. Empedocles and Heraclitus, for example, are early sources of 
pre-Socratic thought on the meaning of determinism in nature and 
the idea of natural law. Ideas concerning determinism-especially the 
influence of divine will-were later given prominence in the fourth 
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century B.C. by the Stoics, the Greek school of philosophy founded 
by Zeno. 
The origins of modern world debate about free will and determinism 
are ordinarily traced to the work of the eighteenth-century French 
astronomer and mathematician Pierre Simon de Laplace. Laplace's 
assertions about determinism in the world as we know it were heavily 
dependent upon the scientific theory of particle mechanics, according 
to which a knowledge of the mechanical state of all particles at some 
particular time together with a knowledge of "all the forces acting in 
nature" at that instant would enable one to discover all future and all 
past states of the world. With this information, one could, in principle, 
discover not only all future and past mechanical states in the world, 
but all others as well, such as electromagnetic, chemical, and psycho- 
logical.3 
The contemporary philosophical debate, as I noted above, boils 
down to a clash between those who credit human beings with the 
ability to make rational willful choices and to act upon those choices, 
independent-at least in part-of prior causes, and those who reject 
this view. Each ideological camp has noteworthy proponents whose 
views range from the moderate to the extreme. For extreme determinists, 
everything, including our thoughts, emotions, and behavior, is the 
effect of some prior cause. As the philosopher Ernest Nagel has observed, 
"determinism in its most general form appears to be the claim that 
for every set of characteristics which may occur at any time, there is 
some system that is deterministic in respect to those occurrences."4 
The doctrine of determinism contains two essential ingredients: a 
belief in universal causal laws and the concept of predictability. In 
principle, any current state of affairs has identifiable determinants 
and knowable, predictable outcomes. According to determinism, then, 
problems such as mental illness, low self-esteem, poverty, crime, child 
abuse, and drug abuse can be traced to historical antecedents that 
have led progressively to the victim's current difficulties. The respon- 
sibility for the client's problems is not his or her own; rather, it resides 
in the onset and consequences of prior events. The implication of the 
determinist point of view, therefore, is that the client is not to be 
considered culpable. He is not to be blamed for his unfortunate cir- 
cumstances. It may appear, of course, that clients engage in the for- 
mulation of rational, independent choices; but this, after all, is only 
an illusion, according to hard-core determinists. What appears to be 
free choice is itself a product of earlier influences, which may be a 
function of genetic endowment, physiology, child rearing, economics, 
politics, and an impressive number of other factors. 
This conclusion means more, however, than that clients are not 
ultimately responsible for their problems. It also means that they are 
able to do little or nothing of consequence to ameliorate them. For 
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extreme determinists, the ability of individuals to make freely formed 
decisions about their futures is nonexistent. Whatever ability we have 
to change is merely the outcome of prior causes. The philosopher 
John Hospers has described this view succinctly: 
The position, then, is this: if we can overcome the effects of early environment, 
the ability to do so is itself a product of the early environment. We did not 
give ourselves this ability; and if we lack it we cannot be blamed for not having 
it. Sometimes, to be sure, moral exhortation brings out an ability that is there 
but not being used, and in this lies its occasional utility; but very often its use 
is pointless, because the ability is not there. The only thing that can overcome 
a desire, as Spinoza said, is a stronger contrary desire; and many times there 
simply is no wherewithal for producing a stronger contrary desire. Those of 
us who do have the wherewithal are lucky.5 
Acceptance of this conclusion would clearly throw cold water on both 
the mission and traditional methods of social work. 
Proponents of the free will school of thought, alternatively, deny 
that the thoughts, emotions, and behavior of all individuals are, at all 
times, a function of prior causes over which individuals have little or 
no control. Adherents to this point of view generally fall short of 
claiming that no events are determined or that all events are truly 
random occurrences. Rather, they claim that some events follow from 
the exercise of free will or choice, that individuals do in fact have the 
capacity to behave independent of prior causes, though to varying 
degrees. As the ethicist Gerald Dworkin has noted, "The claim that 
we have free will is, then, the claim that for some actions at least the 
following condition is true: There is an alternative action (which may 
be simply refraining from the action to be performed) open to the 
agent. Put in the past tense after the agent has performed some action 
A: There was some alternative action which the agent could have 
performed other than the one which he in fact did."'6 Formally, the 
following argument attempts to establish the notion of free will and 
deny determinism: 
1. A necessary condition for holding a person responsible, blaming, or 
punishing him for an act, A, is that the person did A freely. 
2. If determinism is true nobody ever acts freely. 
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one is ever responsible, blameworthy, 
or punishable. 
4. At least sometimes people are responsible, blameworthy, or punishable 
for what they do. 
5. Therefore, determinism is false.7 
Recognizing that questions may be raised about the technical validity 
of this argument, it represents, in sharp relief, the doctrine to which 
determinists are opposed. And the implications of the conclusion of 
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this syllogism are far from trivial. They bear heavily on the willingness 
of social workers to exhort, motivate, and generally work hard with 
clients to bring about meaningful changes in their lives. 
An alternative to extreme views of either free will or determinism, 
but which contains elements of both schools of thought, has become 
known in philosophical circles as the "mixed view" or "soft determinism." 
It is fair to say that currently the mixed view is the most prominent 
in circulation. It essentially entails three assumptions: (1) that the thesis 
of determinism is generally true, and that accordingly all human be- 
havior-both voluntary and nonvoluntary-is preceded and caused 
by antecedent conditions, such that no other behavior is possible; (2) 
that genuinely voluntary behavior is nonetheless possible to the extent 
that it is not coerced; and (3) that, in the absence of coercion, voluntary 
behavior is brought about by the decisions, choices, and preferences 
of the individual himself.8 According to the mixed view, then, human 
behavior is neither wholly determined by external forces nor entirely 
random in nature. There is considerable room for voluntary action. 
The Compatibility Argument 
There is considerable evidence that the doctrine of soft determinism 
is relatively prominent in the profession of social work. In general, 
both the profession's literature and conventional practice wisdom em- 
brace the view that the problems under which clients labor are frequently 
the products of circumstances beyond their control, to varying degrees, 
and that clients themselves are at times partly responsible for their 
difficulties and are-again, to varying degrees-capable of making 
thoughtful, rational, and voluntary decisions to alter the course of 
their lives. Florence Hollis has summarized this sentiment well: "The 
casework position, I would think, would not be that of absolutism in 
either direction. We certainly do not take the libertarian stand that 
each action of man is completely free and unaffected by his previous 
character, life history, or current experience. On the other hand, neither 
do we believe that all choice, all behavior is the determined, necessary 
and inflexible result of previously existing physical or environmental 
causes."9 
This position is based on what philosophers generally refer to as 
the compatibility argument, according to which the free will and de- 
terminist views are not, contrary to first impressions, necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Rather, they can be complementary. This is a view that has 
been espoused over the years by such noteworthy philosophers as 
Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill.1o 
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The compatibility doctrine is thus in sharp contrast to the view of 
those who argue that to admit the possibility of free will is to deny 
determinism, and vice versa. According to the so-called incompatibilist, 
the world and its events cannot be explained by appealing to both the 
free will and determinism doctrines. As the philosopher Richard Taylor 
has observed with respect to the incompatibility thesis, "Ultimate re- 
sponsibility for anything that exists, and hence for any man and his 
deeds, can thus only rest with the first cause of all things, if there is 
such a cause, or nowhere at all, in case there is not."" 
Though the predominant view in social work is generally consistent 
with soft determinism, it is nonetheless clear that there is considerable 
variation of opinion within the profession about the extent to which 
clients are truly victims of circumstances and prior determinants beyond 
their control, as opposed to willful actors who have brought their 
difficulties upon themselves. For example, in their recent review of 
the ideological assumptions, contained, either implicitly or explicitly, 
in introductory social work texts, Ephross and Reisch document con- 
siderable variation in authors' emphases on cultural, economic, political, 
and environmental determinants of social problems."2 The texts fell 
generally into three groups: (1) those that attribute clients' difficulties 
largely to factors that are beyond their control; (2) those that stress 
the capacity of individuals to fashion their own lives and futures, while 
recognizing somewhat the effects of external factors; and (3) those 
that stand midway between these two positions, in that they acknowledge 
clearly "the connections between social work clients and societal forces 
and events."'" Though their discussion is not couched in the philosophical 
language of the free will-determinism debate, it is clear that Ephross 
and Reisch grasp the implications of the controversy for social work 
when they conclude that: 
there are clear differences among the books reviewed as to social, political, 
and economic content, and it seems that these differences are quite important 
for the education of professional social workers. In a sense, one can distribute 
these introductory textbooks over an ideological spectrum. The temptation is 
to visualize such a spectrum as covering a range from "Left" to "Right." These 
terms are used a bit unconventionally here; they do not imply that the authors 
adhere to all of the political views commonly associated with Left or Right 
positions. Rather, the idea is of a scale whose polar points describe conceptions 
of the relationship between societal forces and individual experiences. The 
Left pole, then, encompasses the position that individuals' lives are circumscribed 
and heavily influenced, if not determined, by political, economic, and institutional 
patterns within society. The Right pole attributes to individuals and families 
a great deal of leeway to determine their individual and interpersonal ex- 
periences.'4 
As observed above, the impressive variation in social workers' opinions 
about the extent to which present and future circumstances are shaped 
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by voluntary versus deterministic factors has several noteworthy im- 
plications for professional practice. These implications can be placed 
generally into two categories. First, there are implications related to 
the views social workers have of the culpability and capacity of the 
clients with whom they work. Second, there are implications concerning 
the extent to which social workers believe clients deserve assistance. 
The Culpability and Capacity of Clients 
Though social workers are generally predisposed to identify and un- 
derstand both individual and environmental determinants of clients' 
problems, it is evident that our views of the extent to which clients 
are responsible for their difficulties vary considerably. On the one 
hand are clients whose problems seem due to circumstances well beyond 
their control. These are clients who, we conclude, have not brought 
problems upon themselves. They are true victims. Infants who have 
been physically abused or neglected, people with congenital defects 
(such as physical deformities or mental retardation), and those who 
are diseased at birth are, by and large, regarded as clients who were 
dealt an unfortunate hand at the very start of life. They have not 
behaved in ways that we consider to have invited the serious problems 
from which they suffer. 
At the other extreme are clients who, we are at least at times inclined 
to believe, have made voluntary decisions to lead their lives in ways 
that produce serious problems. Thus, ablebodied poor and unemployed 
who choose not to work merely because of their aversion to the task, 
drug abusers, and criminals are frequently viewed as clients who have, 
so to speak, asked for their troubles. Ablebodied poor could work, 
drug abusers could abstain, and criminals could cease and desist if 
they really wanted to. They have simply exercised their free will to 
the contrary. A true determinist, of course, would argue that there 
are reasons why these people have chosen their problem-laden life- 
styles; they may suffer from a wide variety of intrapsychic maladies, 
economic obstacles, or political impediments that prevent them from 
behaving otherwise, though on the surface it appears that they have 
voluntarily chosen their current circumstances. However, though there 
may be some truth to the determinist's contentions in such cases, what 
is important is that many social workers see these clients as culpable- 
as exercising their free will-and this ultimately affects our professional 
response to them. 
Between these two extremes, of course, are those who seem to straddle 
the free will-determinism fence. These are the clients about whom 
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we are most ambivalent. In their cases we tend to feel torn, caught 
between an intellectual understanding of the factors that may have 
brought about their distress and the frustration of feeling that they 
may have themselves contributed voluntarily to the problem in a sig- 
nificant way, or not done enough to remedy it. With juvenile delinquents, 
for example, social workers have helped blaze a long-standing trail of 
theory constructed to account for youthful mischief. There is by now 
a familiar litany of factors cited to "explain" juvenile delinquency: 
broken homes, child abuse, inferior education, poor role models, ex- 
posure to drugs, and so on. However, despite our intellectual under- 
standing of the antecedents or determinants of delinquency, many of 
us nonetheless are tempted to hold many of these youths responsible 
for their misbehavior. If they would only care enough about themselves, 
think about their behavior and the feelings of others more carefully, 
and take a critical look at their own values, they could surely mend 
their ways. In the final analysis, it is tempting to think that the fault 
may be theirs. We sometimes think similarly about certain aged clients, 
for example, whose forgetfulness, clumsiness, and poor hygiene may 
annoy us; though their increasing frailty may "explain" their behavior, 
it is at times tempting to believe that these nuisances could be relieved 
considerably if they would only try harder. The same holds for those 
clients who now make up a very substantial portion of the social work 
profession's caseload: those who are experiencing one or more of a 
wide range of emotional difficulties, such as poor self-esteem, marital 
conflict, depression, loneliness, or some generalized form of anxiety. 
The Boundaries of Moral Responsibility 
The form and extent of the assistance that social workers choose to 
provide for their clients are influenced in important ways by the degree 
to which they hold their clients responsible for their problems. In this 
respect, there is a close relationship in social work between the concepts 
of moral responsibility and moral desert. 
The concept of moral responsibility implies that individuals can, or 
ought to be, held accountable for their problems and mischief. Of 
course, to assert such a claim is to embrace, at least partially, the notion 
of free will. It would, after all, be irrational to argue that an individual 
whose problems are entirely due to factors beyond his or her control 
(hard-core determinism) is one who should, at the same time, be held 
accountable for them. To attribute fault or blame in such cases would 
fly in the face of logic as we know it. As David Hume observed in his 
eighteenth-century work, A Treatise of Human Nature: 
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'Tis only upon the principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit 
or demerit from his actions.... Actions are by their very nature temporary 
and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters 
and disposition of the person, who perform'd them, they infix not themselves 
upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if 
evil. The action in itself may be blameable .... But the person is not responsible 
for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and constant, 
and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its 
account, become the object of punishment or vengeance.'" 
Yet, though there may be general agreement within the profession 
that clients whose problems are due to circumstances beyond their 
control should not be held responsible for them, there is much less 
clarity about what factors determine whether an individual is truly a 
victim or not. 
Centuries ago, Aristotle argued that an individual is responsible only 
for those actions that are voluntary in nature. According to Aristotle, 
there are two principal ways in which an action can fail to be voluntary: 
it can be the result of compulsion, or it can be carried out in ignorance.'6 
Thus, if an oncoming and recklessly driven auto forces you off the 
road, and in doing so causes your passenger to be injured, you have 
been compelled-due to circumstances we would ordinarily consider 
to be beyond your control-to act as you did. We would not be likely 
to hold you morally responsible for your passenger's injuries. Further, 
if there were some latent defect in your living room chair, and a guest 
fell from it and harmed himself, common sense suggests that you 
should not be held at fault. 
A persistent problem, however, is that while there may be some 
general agreement that coercion and ignorance preclude the assignment 
of moral blame, social workers (and others) have had little success 
reaching agreement about what, in fact, constitutes genuine coercion 
and ignorance. Take the problem of poverty, for example. There is 
at least a general predisposition in the profession to identify the following 
factors as explaining why many people are poor: poor education, 
racism and discrimination, Western capitalism, single-parent status, 
poor health and nutrition, and a host of related liabilities. But, can 
we say that these factors-acting independently or in concert--con- 
stitute coercion and ignorance in the strict sense? It is not hard for 
us to agree that a gun held at our back or organic brain disease 
constitute coercion (though in different forms). But what of factors 
that are, at least according to conventional wisdom, highly correlated 
with poverty? Is it reasonable to assert that these factors compel or 
coerce individuals into poverty? Further, what, if any, distinctions 
should we make between intraindividual factors (physiological or psy- 
chological), which can be coercive, and extraindividual factors? Clearly, 
the degree to which we view poverty as a voluntary or coerced state 
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has profound implications for our response to it. As the philosopher 
J. J. C. Smart observed in an essay on the concepts of free will, praise, 
and blame: 
When, in nineteenth-century England, the rich man brushed aside all con- 
sideration for his unsuccessful rivals in the battle for wealth and position, and 
looking at them as they starved in the gutter said to himself, "Well, they had 
the same opportunities as I had. If I took more advantage of them than they 
did, that is not my fault but theirs," he was most probably not only callous 
but (as I shall try to show) metaphysically confused. A man who said "Heredity 
and environment made me what I am and made them what they are" would 
be less likely to fall a prey to this sort of callousness and indifference. Metaphysical 
views about free will are therefore practically important, and their importance 
is often in inverse proportion to their clarity."7 
A related problem concerns confusion about the distinction between 
holding clients morally responsible for actions that they engage in and 
actions that they fail to engage in. Child abuse, for example, is an act 
of commission for which we are ordinarily inclined to hold individuals 
at least partly responsible, though we may, to some extent, be able to 
identify reasons that explain their behavior. Child neglect, on the other 
hand, is an act of omission. Thus, it appears that the free will-deter- 
minism debate bears on failures to act, in addition to the more common 
concern social workers have with clients whose acts of commission 
draw attention.'8s 
Ordinarily, three preconditions must be satisfied in order to hold 
an individual liable for his or her actions or inaction. First, it must be 
established that the individual committed the harmful act, or at least 
that the action or omission made a substantial contribution to it. Second, 
the individual's conduct must have been in some way faulty. Finally, 
it must be established that there was a causal connection between the 
faulty conduct and the reprehensible outcome.'9 Granted, it is often 
difficult to establish the presence of these preconditions in social work. 
The evidence is not always adequate to determine that a client did 
commit or failed to commit the act of interest. Further, it is often hard 
to know whether the conduct was in fact faulty and led to, in a causal 
way, the regrettable outcome. Nonetheless, practitioners do, in their 
day-to-day work, make such judgments about moral responsibility, 
and these judgments affect the form and content of our responses to 
clients' problems. As I will discuss below, our judgments about what 
clients deserve are frequently predicated upon our attributions of 
moral responsibility. 
The Concept of Desert 
The concept of desert has a variety of connotations, both in general 
and in the profession of social work. These connotations may be positive, 
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as in the case of awarding prizes or rewards for athletic, artistic, or 
scholarly achievements, or negative, as in the case of penalties or 
punishments imposed for misbehavior. Clients may deserve to be re- 
warded, such as when residents of a group home are awarded additional 
privileges following a period of good behavior, or penalized, such as 
when a client's unemployment benefits are discontinued due to the 
reporting of false information. The concept of desert can also have 
relatively neutral connotations, such as when retirement or workers' 
compensation funds are distributed to those who deserve them. There- 
fore, the concept of desert is closely related to both retributive and 
distributive justice. Retributive justice is concerned with penalties and 
rewards. Distributive justice is concerned with allocating services and 
resources.20 
The free will-determinism debate, as it pertains to social work, is 
most closely related to issues of retributive justice. That is, the extent 
to which practitioners are likely to reward or penalize clients is likely 
to be a function of their beliefs about the degree to which clients are 
responsible for their behavior or problems. Consider, for example, 
our response to criminals. Those of us who believe that armed robbers 
are rational individuals who voluntarily decide to assault their victims 
are tempted to endorse the imposition of penalties, in the name of 
punishment, retribution, and, perhaps, deterrence. Justice demands 
that the perpetrator be held accountable to the community for his or 
her misdeeds. Immanuel Kant is ordinarily credited with the classic 
statement concerning this so-called retributivist point of view: 
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice takes 
as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by which the 
pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than 
the other. It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any 
one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself. ... This 
is the right of retaliation (jus talionis); and properly understood, it is the only 
principle which in regulating a public court, as distinguished from mere private 
judgment, can definitely assign both the quality and quantity ofa just penalty.2' 
A strict determinist, however, would make no such demands; unpleasant 
but compelling reasons can be found to explain the offender's behavior. 
It is simply inappropriate to conclude that the offense was the product 
of rational free will. As the attorney Clarence Darrow once said to 
inmates confined in Cook County (Chicago) Jail: "I do not believe in 
any sort of distinction between the real moral conditions of the people 
in and out of jail. . . . I do not believe that people are in jail because 
they deserve to be. They are in jail simply because they cannot avoid 
it on account of circumstances which are entirely beyond their control 
and for which they are in no way responsible."22 An excerpt from John 
Hospers's classic essay, "What Means This Freedom?" summarizes suc- 
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cinctly the determinist's position on this issue as viewed through the 
philosopher's lens: 
There are many actions-not those of an insane person (however the term 
"insane" be defined), nor of a person ignorant of the effects of his action, nor 
ignorant of some relevant fact about the situation, nor in any obvious way 
mentally deranged-for which human beings in general and the courts in 
particular are inclined to hold the doer responsible, and for which, I would 
say, he should not be held responsible .... Let us take as an example a criminal 
who, let us say, strangled several persons and is himself now condemned to 
die in the electric chair. Jury and public alike hold him fully responsible (at 
least they utter the words "he is responsible"), for the murders were planned 
down to the minutest detail, and the defendant tells the jury exactly how he 
planned them. But now we find out how it all came about; we learn of parents 
who rejected him from babyhood, of the childhood spent in one foster home 
after another, where it was always plain to him that he was not wanted; of 
the constantly frustrated early desire for affection, the hard shell of nonchalance 
and bitterness that he assumed to cover the painful and humiliating fact of 
being unwanted, and his subsequent attempts to heal these wounds to his 
shattered ego through defensive aggression.23 
A final comment is in order on the concept of desert and its relevance 
to social work. Though our beliefs about the victimization of clients 
frequently lead us to conclude that they should not be held accountable 
for their actions (and therefore deserve assistance) on occasion our 
sentiments about particular clients' moral worth can taint and dilute 
these convictions. Social workers' long-standing involvement with the 
poor illustrates this point. The profession has, generally speaking, 
been cognizant of and sympathetic to the reasons why people are 
poor. We are painfully aware that physical and mental disability, en- 
trenched racism and discrimination, cyclical and structural unem- 
ployment, and age-factors over which individuals ordinarily do not 
have much control-account for the lion's share of those who are 
below the official poverty line. The percentage of poor who are genuinely 
ablebodied is impressively low. Nonetheless, there can be found in 
many professional social work circles at least a subtle contempt for 
the poor, a feeling that, despite all we know, many of these people 
neither appreciate nor, perhaps, are worthy of our various services 
and ministrations. In some instances, our latent resentment of our 
clients casts a shadow on our intellectual understanding of their status 
as victim. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt commented on this problem 
in an essay on the subject of coercion and moral responsibility: 
We do on some occasions find it appropriate to make an adverse judgment 
concerning a person's submission to a threat, even though we recognise that 
he has genuinely been coerced and that he is therefore not properly to be 
held morally responsible for his submission. This is because we think that the 
person, although he was in fact quite unable to control a desire, ought to 
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have been able to control it.... It may be that we have a low opinion of 
someone who is incapable of defying a threat of the kind in question; and 
our judgment that he ought to have been able to defy it may express this 
feeling that he is not much of a man. This has nothing to do with judging 
him as deserving blame-if he should feel anything, it is not guilt but shame- 
and it is entirely compatible with the belief that he had actually no choice but 
to do what he did. Indeed it depends upon this belief. It is just because we 
recognise that we cannot expect better from him that we hold him in a certain 
contempt."24 
The Paradox of Determinism 
My comments thus far have concerned the implications of the free 
will-determinism debate for the views social workers have of the culp- 
ability, capacity, and worthiness of clients. It is important to note, 
however, that frequently issues related to free will and determinism 
bear on clients' views of themselves, their interpretation of past events, 
and their fantasies about the future. A letter that I recently received 
from an inmate with whom I once worked in a state penitentiary 
illustrates this. This young man is serving a sentence for murder. 
During the course of our work together we had spent some time 
speculating about why he killed the people he did. His case was com- 
plicated by the fact that he was under the influence of potent drugs 
at the time of the murders. 
The history of abuse and neglect to which this fellow had been 
subjected as a child is filled with a series of disconcerting events. 
Listening to his life story, it is no surprise that he followed a wayward 
path. Yet until the night when he murdered neighbors he barely knew- 
for no apparent reason-he had committed no serious acts of violence 
and had had only minor brushes with the law. He too found something 
terribly mystifying about his crime. In the end, he could not help but 
wonder whether he is ultimately responsible for what he had done: 
"In my own case," he wrote, "I didn't want to kill anyone, didn't intend 
to, and realized I had done so only after it was done. I guess that's 
why I hate myself. Because I lost control of myself while on drugs 
and killed three people. It's simple to say, well, I was on drugs and 
didn't know what I was doing. But then no one forced the drugs on 
me. I took them on my own free will. So who's to blame?" 
One of the ironies of social work is that both members of the profession 
and their clients tend to embrace simultaneously both the free will 
and determinism doctrines. On the one hand, we persistently pursue 
the discovery of grand psychological, sociological, political, and economic 
theories that will enable us to fully grasp how and why people become 
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plagued by (or plague themselves with) problems in living. If we were 
in fact successful in our quest for full understanding, we would have, 
by definition, established a chain of causal connections between an- 
tecedent conditions or events and the problems under which people 
labor, thereby establishing the validity of determinism. Yet, the im- 
plications of such determinism for a profession such as social work 
are profound, given the earnestness of our collective belief that in- 
dividuals have a considerable capacity to shape their lives and futures. 
We frequently view clients' problems deterministically-attempting to 
locate intra- and extraindividual factors that account for problematic 
behaviors and attitudes--yet our forms of intervention spring from 
assumptions about free will and self-determination.25 As Tolstoy once 
noted regarding this paradox, "The problem of free will from earliest 
times has occupied the best intellects of mankind and has from earliest 
times appeared in all its colossal significance. The problem lies in the 
fact that if we regard man as a subject for observation from whatever 
point of view-theological, historical, ethical or philosophic-we find 
the universal law of necessity to which he (like everything else that 
exists) is subject. But looking upon man from within ourselves-man 
as the object of our own inner consciousness of self-we feel ourselves 
to be free."'26 There is thus an enduring tension between our desire 
to understand and explain human affairs by uncovering detailed causal 
connections and our need to see ourselves, and others, as autonomous 
individuals who are not subject entirely to intrapsychic, biological, and 
environmental factors that lie beyond our control. 
Throughout the history of social work there has been some shift 
between our emphasis on free will and determinism, largely as a function 
of the passage of broader political, historical, and philosophical world 
views. For example, there was considerably more emphasis on the 
moral culpability of clients during the heyday of the Charity Organization 
Society than during the subsequent growth of the settlement house 
movement. This was the result of a growing recognition that poverty 
and its correlates are frequently the result of external determinants, 
not failures of individual character.27 The politics of the Progressive 
Era were in sharp contrast to those that sanctioned and encouraged 
the nineteenth-century free market philosophy that depended heavily 
on assumptions of free will, self-determination, and individual autonomy. 
The disconcerting events of the Great Depression of the 1930s also 
shifted considerable weight toward the determinism side of the scale, 
as did the popularization of Marxism and the noteworthy influence 
of Freudian views of human behavior that captured the attention of 
the social work profession. Currently, we appear to be in the midst of 
a partial ideological shift away from determinism-at least as reflected 
by contemporary social welfare policies promulgated by federal and 
state politicians, legislators, and administrators-toward the view that 
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many of our domestic problems (e.g., poverty, crime) could be solved 
if only we had the (free) will to confront them.28 
The main point is that these broad shifts in world view have always 
managed to plant ideological seeds in social work, and the outgrowths 
have had significant effects on the resources available to and strategies 
of the profession's practitioners. In general, the greater the emphasis 
on determinism, the greater social workers' emphasis on social change 
has been; the greater the emphasis on individual autonomy and free 
will, the greater the profession's emphasis on casework and client self- 
determination. As the philosopher R. F. Stalley has observed, "the 
main effect of the acceptance of a doctrine of determinism with all its 
implications would probably be to turn the attention of social workers 
away from casework with individuals to other kinds of social ac- 
tion. ... If, on the other hand, human behaviour is not determined 
by the environment there will still be some problems, however much 
the environment is improved, and only work with the individual could 
help to solve these."'"29 
It is essential for social workers to appreciate the implications of 
their embrace of the free will or determinism doctrines, whether in 
their extreme or moderate forms. The views we develop of our clients' 
moral responsibility and capacity for change are a function in large 
part of the position we take in the free will-determinism debate. It is 
unlikely, of course, that this debate will ever be fully resolved. As 
Tolstoy noted, there is something compelling about both theses. There 
is incontrovertible evidence that much of human action is affected by 
forces that extend beyond individual control and choice. Nevertheless, 
it is hard to imagine that determinism does not have limits, that human 
beings do not in fact maintain some degree of nontrivial control over 
their own lives, even if some of what we call autonomy is an illusion.30 
The physical and natural sciences by now have an impressive collection 
of data and theories that explain large numbers of phenomena in our 
world, a record that surpasses by far the accomplishments in the social 
sciences. Laplace's early observations concerning particle mechanics 
in physics served as the forerunner of a proliferation of deterministic 
accounts of both physical and social events. However, despite the 
noteworthy achievements of the world of science, when we aggregate 
our findings we have failed to explain adequately many of the phe- 
nomena about which we care most. We still know distressingly little, 
for example, about why some people neglect their children, abuse 
drugs, become depressed, commit crimes, and take their own lives. 
Our multivariate analyses frequently turn up little beyond the obvious, 
ultimately explaining, in too many instances, a discouragingly small 
percentage of the variance in our dependent variables. We know a lot 
as a result of our decades of empirical inquiry, but we must recognize 
that the boundaries that enclose our current knowledge are still relatively 
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narrow. We are far from a true determinist's understanding of the 
world in which we live. And, as the Oxford philosopher Anthony 
Kenny has reflected, there must be a certain modesty in our expectations: 
One may query whether we have any reason to believe that there can be a 
successful science of human behavior; but this response will no doubt appear 
unhelpful and pessimistic. It may be more productive to inquire from what 
features of the history of scientific progress one is supposed to extrapolate. 
Is one to point to the success of deterministic explanation in Newtonian 
mechanics, or to its lack of success in stimulus-response psychology? It is 
impossible not to be impressed by the present availability of mechanistic ex- 
planations for many physical phenomena which were explained teleologically 
until the time of Descartes. But perhaps one should be no less impressed by 
the continuing impossibility of explaining, in terms of sufficient antecedent 
conditions, any psychological phenomenon which would have been regarded 
as voluntary in the time of Aristotle.3' 
The intractability of the free will-determinism debate has led to 
some unfortunate frustration in our efforts to understand life's events 
and design responses to them when problems arise. But the persistence 
of the debate has also taught us important lessons. Controversies that 
remain unresolved after centuries of sustained attention rarely concern 
trivial matters. The free will-determinism debate endures because it 
entails concepts that are fundamentally important. Even if our labored 
attempts to resolve this debate do not settle the controversy, we will 
have, in the process, addressed ourselves to matters that represent the 
heart of our profession. In the final analysis, social workers will likely 
continue to espouse a mixed or soft view of determinism, believing 
both that clients' problems are, to a considerable extent, the products 
of prior causes, and that the voluntary action of clients can contribute 
to their problems and help to solve them. Assuming this to be so, the 
personal conclusions we reach about the moral responsibility and capacity 
of clients (whether voluntarily or as a result of our own historical 
antecedents) stand to have significant consequences for the people 
with whom we work. 
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